|
In 1971, during a broadcast conversation transmitted
by the BBC, K. Popper affirmed that, as he wore spectacles, every now and
then he cleaned them. But spectacles have a function, and they function
only when you put them on, to look through them at the world. It is the
same with language and therefore, concluded Popper, one should not waste
one's life in spectacle-cleaning or in talking about language.
The analysis of language and the logic are without doubt useful to the
philosopher, sometimes essential (who looks through dirty spectacles
sometimes makes a blunder), but under no circumstances should they exhaust
the philosophical activity. Vice versa an examination of the twentieth
century analytic philosophy shows that many authors, abandoning the
moderate and generally accepted thesis according to which language
analysis can indeed be useful to philosophy as such, allowing this to
assume as far as possible a rigorous status and avoid falling into
excessive verbosity as an end to itself, have ended up investing a load on
language which, as it is a communication tool, it is not capable of
assuming.
It is illogical to think of resolving ontological or ethical problems
simply with the analysis of language, because, as Evandro Agazzi rightly
comments, "within this philosophy (of language) there's not much to
say about the "kind of reality" which is up to the referent and
this for the good reason that this is not a linguistic problem." In
other words:
" … the linguistic version of a
philosophical problem may be a useful heuristic device for attacking the
problem, just as in deciding certain questions of geography it is useful
to translate them into questions regarding the positions of marks on a map.
But just as it would be ludicrous to supposed that maps constitute the
entire subject matter of geography, so also it would be to great mistake
to suppose that philosophy is or ought to be nothing more than the study
of language." .
Within this conception of the analysis of language
, only the matter of rationality of ethics will be examined, i.e. the
relationship between knowledge of the world and ourselves and ethics, in
an attempt to delineate some meaningful contributions that can be drawn
from the analytic philosophy and the semantics of the deontic logic
systems.
1. Wittgenstein and the
neopositivism
In the Tractatus (1921) Wittgenstein affirms the
total heterogeneity between facts and values: "The sense of the world
must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and
happens as it does happen. In it there is no value - and if there were, it
would be of no value" (6.4.1). Therefore, within the conception of
language formulated in this book, it follows that "It is clear that
ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics are transcendental." (6.421)
It is a drastic re-proposition of the so-called Hume's law, according to
which, starting from factual affirmations (what it is) it is impossible to
logically derive prescriptions or judgments of value (what ought to be).
Since for the Tractatus the only significant language is that concerning
facts (a descriptive language), whoever tries to formulate propositions
about ethics, necessarily meets with non-sense sentences. At the end of
the Lecture on ethics in November 1929, referring to everything that is
attempted to be said on ethics and on values, Wittgenstein affirms:
"I see now that these nonsensical expressions
were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions,
but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to
do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond
significant language. My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of
all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run
against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our
cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from
the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the
absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does
not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency
in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I
would not for my life ridicule it" .
The neopositivistic interpretation of Tractatus,
drawn up by the Vienna Circle, underlines the nonsense of the ethics
theories and tends to reduce the propositions containing evaluative terms
as mere expression of emotions. In 1931 Carnap writes:
"The judgment (pronounced on the nonsense of
all metaphysics) also extends to philosophy of values and norms, to all
ethics or aesthetics as a prescriptive subject. Since the objective truth
of a value or norms cannot be (...) empirically verified or be deduced
from empiric propositions, given this, it cannot be expressed in any way (by
a sensible proposition)" .
With similar motivations, the great thinkers of the
Vienna Circle took this iconoclast direction which, reducing moral
judgments to emotions, removed ethics from philosophy and denied that the
rationality performs any role in moral controversies. The only important
exception within the Vienna Circle is constituted by the thought of V.
Kraft, who tries to deduce the sense of evaluative concepts using the
logical analysis of the same and individualizes in impersonality a
characteristic of the judgments of value .
In Great Britain, Alfred Ayer with Language, Truth and Logic (1936) is as
drastic as the Viennese:
"We can now see why it is impossible to
find a criterion for determining the validity of ethical judgements. It is
not because they have an "absolute" validity which is
mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but because they
have not objective validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes no statement
at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether what it says is true
or false. And we have seen that sentences which simply express moral
judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood" .
Therefore it is impossible to dispute about
questions of value. Argument is possible on moral questions only if some
system of values is presupposed; otherwise, if two persons are stating two
opposite moral judgments, they are merely expressing different moral
sentiments. "I know that there is plainly no sense in asking which of
them is in the right." .
2. Popper, Toulmin and
Hare
At the end of the second world war, in the ambit of
empiristic philosophy, or more generally among the philosophers who accept
Hume's law, there are no well defined ethical theories which do not fall
within the emotivistic or the intuitionistic conceptions. The latter was
developed in Great Britain starting from the Principia Ethicas of Moore
(1903), particularly with Prichard and Ross . The role of rationality in
ethics appears to be undermined or in some cases entirely invalidated;
ethics is actually expelled from the sphere of philosophy and dissolved in
psychology or sociology. It is considered possible to analyze and explain
behaviours and customs also from the historical point of view, but not to
rationally and critically examine the value of ethical prescriptions as
such. An important exception to this tendency is provided by K. Popper. In
The Open Society and its Enemies (1943) he maintains a dualism ("a
decisive asymmetry") of facts and decision and a dualism of facts and
norms: "it is impossible to derive a sentence stating a norm or a
decision or, say, a proposal for a policy from a sentence stating a fact;
this is only another way of saying that it is impossible to derive norms
or decisions or proposal from facts" Maintaining the view that moral
norms are conventional, he states that the artificiality of them by no
means implies full arbitrariness and he holds that ethical norms and
political proposals are open to rational discussion and corrigible for
they are critically evaluated. Nevertheless Popper does not process an
organic theory of ethics. A definite revaluation of the role of reason in
ethics occurs at the beginning of the fifties, with three works that
represent milestones in the twentieth century philosophy: An Examination
of the Place of Reason in Ethics (1950, but completed in 1948) of S.E.
Toulmin , Deontic Logic (1951) by G.H. von Wright , which presents the
fundamental notions for applying symbolic logic to ethical language, and
The Language of Morals (1952) by R.M. Hare .
The theories of Toulmin and Hare have been influenced, as almost all the
analytic philosophy, by the reflection of the later Wittgenstein. The
first part of the Philosophische Untersuchungen (published posthumous in
1953) had already been completed in 1945 and Wittgenstein's new ideas (on
the meaning of propositions, exclusively determined by the use in a given
linguistic game, of language as a family of linguistic games and on the
decision to forego searching for an absolute logical base in the
procedural formalities of language) broadly circulated in Great Britain by
means of the blue and brown books, dictated by the same Wittgenstein
between 1933 and 1935 . Wittgenstein's new conception on the nature of
language and on the function of the philosophical analysis made it
possible to completely abandon the theory of the meaning as a
representation (and accordingly the privileged role assigned to
descriptive language) and to consider rationality of reasoning no longer
solely in function of the empirical verifiability criterions.
Toulmin, in particular, sustains that as moral judgments, and also
scientific ones, are made in relation to our experience, they can be
subjected to a critical discussion and they do not result therefore, in
principle, to be incorrigible. Moral judgments have the purpose of
allowing us to separate those cases of actions which seem or appear to be
correct and are indeed so, from the other cases where our feelings are a
bad guideline and make things appear correct when in reality they are not.
"In ethics, as in science, incorrigible but conflicting reports of
personal experience (sensible or emotional) are replaced by judgments
aiming at universality and impartiality" .
Toulmin's research aimed at identifying the role of rationality in ethics
by the analysis of moral language however is strictly related to an
assumption which is not logically formal, and on the contrary pertaining
to content, which is given as an axiom. For the English philosopher "we
can fairly characterise ethics as to part of the process whereby the
desires and actions of the members of to community are harmonised" .
This delimitation of the content of ethics is assumed simply because
"the only context in which the concept of duty is straightforwardly
intelligible is one of communal life; it is, indeed, completely bound up
with the very feature of communal life, that we learn to renounce our
claims and alter our aims where they conflict with those of our fellow."
.
In Toulmin's opinion, moral concepts must be analyzed according to their
use; therefore it is possible to distinguish different uses of moral
concepts and, consequently, also of moral judgments. They can be used both
to express our feeling (it is the emotional element, always present in
moral judgments, but considered as neither essential nor predominant), and
also in coming to decision about an individual action, as well as in
criticising and modifying our social practices, and in conclusion for
other uses again . In the second case, the rational evaluation is aimed at
determining the coherence of an individual action in comparison to a given
norm. In the third case however the validity of a regulation is
teleological compared to the "utilitarian" improvement of the
associated life. Two different kinds of moral reasoning are therefore
possible according to the two different kinds of questions that man asks.
A more radical and global justification of ethics not only is not possible,
but it would also have no sense. The question: "what makes - in
general - an ethical reasoning valid?" is in Toulmin's opinion simply
badly expressed and without meaning.
Hare's conception of ethics is however more unitary and organic. In Hare's
opinion the prescriptive language includes both imperatives and
value-judgments, within which there is the moral judgments subset.
Imperatives can be singular or universal, while value-judgments are always
universal. Prescriptivity is therefore an essential characteristic of
moral judgments. Approximately the difference between descriptive
statements and prescriptions is delineated as follows: "If we assent
to a statement we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we
believe that it is true (believe what the speaker has said). If, on the
other hand, we assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves,
we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we do or resolve to
do what the speaker has told us to do; if we do not do it but only resolve
to do it later, then if, when the occasion arises for doing it, we do not
do it, we are said to have changed our mind, we are no longer sticking to
the assent which we previously expressed. It is a tautology to say that we
cannot sincerely assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves,
and at the same time not perform it, if now is the occasion for performing
it and it is in our (physical and psychological) power to do so." .
I.e. Hare is convinced that morals have a sense if they direct, or want to
direct, human behaviour. After all it is an answer to the question: "what
shall I do?", in fact: "If we were to ask of a person "What
are his moral principles?" the way in which we could be most sure of
a true answer would be by studying what he did." . Subsequently Hare
will define prescriptivity in a more formal way: "We say something
prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some situation S and some
person P, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not, in S, do
A, he logically must be assenting insincerely" .
For Hare in every statement it is possible to distinguish a phrastic
element, which aims to point out, that expresses the content, what is
being referred to, and a neustic element, that points out the modality (affirmative,
interrogative or prescriptive) with which the phrastic element is affirmed
or requested or ordered.
In order for the statement to be meaningful, it is sufficient that the
phrastic element is meaningful.
In Hare's opinion inference (i.e. the possibility to logically derive a
sentence from two or more premises) is also possible in the moral field.
It is possible for example to derive singular imperative conclusions from
an universally imperative sentence, combined with minor indicative (or
descriptive) premises. In order for moral interferences to be valid, it is
evidently necessary to respect the rules of the formal logic for what
concerns the phrastic element of the sentences. But this is not enough and
two further principles have to be introduced: (1) it is not possible to
draw any descriptive conclusion if it is not validly obtainable only from
the descriptive sentences contained in the premises and (2) it is not
possible to draw any valid prescriptive conclusion from a series of
premises that does not contain at least one prescriptive sentence. The
second principle is a rigorous reformulation of the so-called Hume's law.
With these distinctions related to language now identified, it is possible
to observe that the evaluative terms (for instance "good")
always have, both in ordinary and philosophic language, a double function:
evaluative and descriptive.
The evaluative function is aimed at praising or approving a given object
or action and is directly achieved from the prescriptive character that is
typical to each judgment which includes an evaluative term (from this
point of view in "a good tennis racket" and in "helping the
neighbour is a good action" the term "good" has the same
evaluative function).
The descriptive function of an evaluative term is related to the ability
to transmit information on the conformity of the object compared to the
criterion that establishes the application of the same evaluative term,
since the evaluative meaning of "good" is very different from
explaining one of the various criteria which regulates the application. To
clarify further, following example can be considered: if a radio
commentator, referring to a football match, affirms that "team N has
played a good first half, despite the result is a draw", he mainly
wants to inform the listeners who, if they are competent in football, will
interpret the statement in accordance to the criteria for which it makes
sense to say that a team plays well (if it creates goal actions, if it
dominates in midfield, if it maintains ball possession, etc.). But when
the coach, speaking to the players in the locker room and referring to the
same match, says: "you have played a good first half", he wants
to praise them and exhort them to continue with the same commitment, that
is he wants to direct their behaviour.
As a direct consequence of this distinction (that is valid for all
evaluative judgments, as shown in the example, and not only for the
ethical ones) it is deduced that in every moral judgment the prescriptive
function is essential and can not be eliminated, while the descriptive
function, that is always present, but at different levels, transmits
implicit information on the basis of socially approved criteria. This
latter aspect can be considered important for example by the sociologist
or the psychologist, but it is irrelevant from the point of view of
philosophical ethics. The lack of comprehension of this distinction is at
the base of many philosophical errors on ethics and, in particular, is at
the origin of the trend of considering evaluative adjectives as qualities
or natural properties of things (both "good" and "red"
are, from a grammatical point of view, qualifying adjectives, but their
function in language is considerably different).
Prescriptivity alone is not enough to define moral judgments. In Hare's
opinion they also have to be universalizable and overriding. A judgment is
universalizable when the condition is satisfied according to which, in all
identical cases with regards to their relevant universal properties, the
relative moral judgment has to be identical. This means that it is
contradictory to formulate different moral judgments of situations where
we admit its identity in relation to the universal properties. In
particular, universalizability means that a subject, if he affirms to have
to perform a certain action towards another person, has to think (if he
doesn't want to contradict himself) that the same action has to be done to
him, if he was in the same identical situation as the other person.
A judgment, however, is considered predominant when it is believed that
what it prescribes should be performed even if it is in conflict with
other principles of non-ethical nature (for instance aesthetical
principles) or with other non-universalizable prescriptions (for example
common desires).
On the basis of these presuppositions, Hare then proceeded to construct an
articulated theory of ethics which foresees a distinction in three levels
of moral thought (intuitive, critic and metaethical) on which is not
possible to report herein. Apart from the contrasting evaluations that
have been formulated on the total work carried out by Hare and even on the
meaning of evolution according to his thought, it is however remarkable to
underline that the characteristics of prescriptivity, universalizability
and overridingness of moral judgments are achieved with a method that we
can define as transcendental: who uses moral language in a meaningful and
effective way cannot set aside (unless he wants to contradict himself) the
obligations which derive from these said characteristics.
Obviously, it is always possible, for instance for the hedonist, not to
use the moral language: he can, if he wants, act differently from what the
morals prescribe him, where also a chess player, if he wants, can make a
move in contrast with what prescribed by the theory of openings.
3. Systems of deontic
logic
A further contribution to the revaluation of the
role of rationality in ethics comes from the remarkable development of the
deontic logics over the last decades, starting from the already mentioned
essay of von Wright in 1951. In 1926, the Austrian philosopher Ernst Mally
(1879-1944) proposed the first formal system of deontic logic, in the book
The Basic Laws of Ought: Elements of the Logic of Willing , but the
deontic logic is indeed common among philosophers starting from the early
fifties. Von Wright was the first to introduce the term "deontic
logic" and promoted and presided in March 1975 at the first
international Conference on deontic logic, held in Bielefeld (Germany).
During this conference, the most important researchers on the subject
compared both the specific problems relating to this sector of logic, and
the application of the deontic logic systems to ethics, rights and social
sciences . The development of this sector of symbolic logic has been
impetuous: the bibliography in the appendix of the Conference documents,
which reaches and includes the year 1976, consists in an impressive 1460
titles!
It is common knowledge that the deontic logic systems can be considered as
semantic interpretations of modal logic systems, which in turn are an
extension of the classical logic.
In the deontic logic systems the necessity modality is interpreted as
obligation (duty), whilst the possibility is interpreted as permission.
From the syntactic point of view the deontic logic systems do not differ
at all from the modal logic systems: the rules of inference are identical
and include the rules of the classical propositional logic, further to the
so-called rule of necessitation, common to almost all the modal logic
systems, according to which if a formula P is derivable from a set of
formulas N, then the same is worth if N and P are modalised by the
operator of necessity.
The semantic aspect is very different. If one takes as reference the
relational semantics of Kripke (that is an extension of the Tarskian
classical logic), the originally Leibnizian concept of "possible
world" of the modal semantics, is interpreted as a "deontic
alternative". In intuitive terms, the deontic alternatives of a given
world m can be thought as those possible worlds that allow different ways
of realizing the obligations present in m.
Many deontic logic systems have been formalized that differ from each
other in the inclusion of some axioms. Which philosophically valid
differences involve the formalisation of an ethical theory in a system
rather than in another? The systems of modal logic generally have in
common the axiom according to which, if a proposition P is necessary, then
it is also possible. In the deontic logic this means stating that
prescribing something implicates the existence of at least an alternate
situation to the current status where, what has to be (that is now
prescribed) is effective: in other words, what is prescribed has to be at
least possible (i.e. allowed). Even if, evidently it is possible that this
possibility will never actually be realised: that is, a moral precept, an
obligation, can be meaningful and not contradictory even if, in effect, it
is never complied with.
All these systems instead exclude the necessity axiom (that vice versa is
fundamental in the most known modal logic systems) according to which if a
proposition is necessary, then it is also true and possible in every way.
This exclusion is intuitively acceptable. If what is prescribed would
necessarily come true under all the possible alternatives, the specificity
of the concept of deontic normativity would be forsaken, which would
coincide with the physical necessity (given an initial situation and given
some physical laws, a certain consequence X must necessarily happen: a
body, left without constraints, must "necessarily" fall).
However there are also some differences: in some systems there is no
cumulativity, that is in the passage from a given world to a deontic
alternative there is no maintenance of obligations. These systems, also
referred to as minimal systems, represent abstract situations in which
there is no unitary practical project, but a new project is proposed in
every deontic alternative.
In other systems however there is a cumulativity of obligations; each
deontic alternative introduces additional obligations in comparison to
those of the former alternatives in the order of succession. Such models
are also clearly important from a practical point of view: their worlds
correspond to the intermediary steps of the realization of a project,
whose construction proceeds only gradually, setting at each step new
obligations in addition to those already included in the former situations.
On the contrary, in other systems there can be a decrease of obligations,
but not an increase; instead there is a conservativity of permissions. In
other different systems conservativity is possible for both obligations
and permissions.
In view of the above, it is possible to draw some philosophical
evaluations on the rational nature of ethics.
First and foremost it must be said that, if even the semantic models of
the modal logic aimed at treating the physical necessity do not play any
practical role in the scientist's activity, both in relation to
experimental research and the theoretical setup of physics, it is not
possible to pretend that the deontic logic systems can be conclusive in
establishing the validity of a moral theory in comparison to another. As
mathematics alone is not enough to formulate even the simplest law of
physics or the rules of chess do not teach one how to win a game. The
semantics of the modal systems is nevertheless able to play an interesting
role when comparing different conceptual visions from a metatheoric
reflection point of view.
The deontic logic shows that the ethical theories - at least in principle
- can be expressed in a formal and rigorous language, that makes it
possible to emphasize which contents are axiomatically assumed (and
therefore cannot be proved), that possible internal contradictions of an
ethical conception can be shown in incontrovertible way, and above all
that, from a logic point of view, the analysis of an ethical theory can be
developed with the same identical rigor of the analysis of a physical
theory.
This is enough to show to what extent the emotivistic and intuitionistic
conceptions of ethics are inadequate and unsatisfactory. This is also
enough to eradicate the classical common place according to which the
concepts of ethics must necessarily result approximate and not rigorously
definable such as scientific concepts and that ethical prescriptions
having universal form are only "usually" valid or in the
majority of the cases.
4. Hume's law
Since the philosophical debate on ethics in the
Sixties and Seventies, strongly influenced by the thought of Toulmin, Hare
and other analytical philosophers, concluded in focusing on the
metaethical aspect, i.e. on the linguistic-formal nature of moral
judgments, on their prescriptive character and particularly on the
validity or not of Hume's law , it can be interesting to ask oneself if
the developments of the deontic logic have brought important contributions
in favour of the supporters or of the detractors of the Hume's law. It is
perhaps surprising that among the most convinced researchers on deontic
logic there is no identity of views on this point.
O. Weinberger sustains that if each normative sentence (that is
prescriptive) was reducible (that is transformable according to well
precise rules) to a descriptive sentence, Hume's law would definitely be
disproved. He defines reductionists as those who think that this reduction
is as principle possible and normativists as those who sustain the
inderivability of the normative from the descriptive. He also affirms that
the normativists can recognise with satisfaction that, despite the
continuous attempts of reduction, the reductionists are affirming the
general recognition of the semantic independence of the normative
sentences in comparison to purely descriptive sentences, and that every
attempt of reduction is a diagnosis of the failure of the former .
On the other hand G. Kalinowski, using the Tarskian
concept of truth in formalized languages, sustains that ethical and
juridical norms can be true or false: it follows the negation of the
absolute heterogeneity between descriptive and prescriptive sentences.
Nevertheless he admits immediately later that the prevailing thesis among
the logics is the opposite one (norms are neither true nor false and there
is no sense in asking if they are) since the deontic logic systems
"can be interpreted in expressions that do not fall into the
categories of true and false" in the sense that both these said
logical systems, both the internal coherence (consistence) of the existing
juridical and the moral norm systems would remain unchanged "even if
the norms (moral and juridical) were (contrarily to what I think) neither
true nor false" .
By performing a certain level of drastic simplification, all of this can
be interpreted in the following way: the deontic logic systems (their
axioms, the rules of inference etc.) are neutral towards Hume's law, that
is "they work" and have meaning for both whoever believes that
the norms have a value of truth, and for whoever sustains the opposite
thesis (furthermore the Euclid geometry "works" and is coherent
for both those who believe its postulations are true, and for who consider
them mere hypotheses or conventions). From this point of view the notion
of truth becomes fundamental; in the followings propositions: (1) "it
is true that in this room there are five people", (2) "the
theorem T is true in the Euclid geometry" and (3) "it is true
that you must not steal", the term "true" apparently has
the same meaning and, in respect to common sense, it is correctly used in
all three cases.
In reality in the first case it is used without implicit conditions: the
truth value of the affirmation depends only on the meaning of the terms
and from the state of fact. However in the other two cases it expresses
the coherence with some premises, with the axioms of a theory or an
ethical or juridical normative system: it does not refer to the world, but
to a theory. But at the same time the term "true" is used in:
(4) "it is true that all statements of a formalized language are
divided into descriptive and prescriptive". It follows that, at least
in the ambit of the Tarskian conception of truth, the "Great division"
(between prescriptive and descriptive) in itself is neither true nor false
and Hume's law (i.e. the impossibility to logically derive prescriptive
sentences from descriptive premises) is definitely correct, but on the
condition of having chosen to adopt the Great division. Therefore the
statement "all sentences of a formalized language are divided into
descriptive and prescriptive" is not analytical, (his opposite is not
contradictory) but it must be assumed (with prescriptive value) if you
want to analyze the language of morals (as Hare does) or if you want to
develop a deontic logic.
These considerations related to the logical-linguistic point of view can
shine new light on the philosophical dispute on Hume's law.
It is perhaps possible to risk a general evaluation: the attempts to
disprove Hume's law on the logical-linguistic plan have decidedly failed
and therefore the critics of the ethical non-cognitivism can only follow
the two remaining roads: (a) Hume's law, valid from the formal point of
view, is however "empty", since the purely descriptive plan does
not exist; (b) Hume's law is irrelevant from a practical point of view, as
there are some evaluative sentences universally approved (of the type:
"it is better to be healthy that sick" or "you must do what
it is right").
The most important attempts to follow the first road can be brought back
to the thought of K.O. Apel, that sustains that even the sciences of
nature are not purely non-evaluative (descriptive), but
normative-hermeneutical, that can always imply a principle of normative
evaluation in the logicality. In Apel's opinion the same inter-subjective
communication implies some moral norms: purely constative sentences do not
exist, but the performative dimension is always present, even if implicit.
With a little forcing also the radical critic of B. Williams on
prescriptivism is similar to this position, at least where he sustains
that the theorists of the distinction fact-value, even though they count
on linguistic analysis, instead of discovering their distinction in
language, they put it there themselves .
Less convincing, despite appearances, is the second road. Less convincing
in this sense: it is true that normally ethical or political controversies
do not concern the validity of the first principles (of the type "all
citizens are equal before the law" or "a person's freedom is
guaranteed until the same compromises the freedom of others") but the
concrete applications of these principles; in such cases the validity (or
not) of Hume's law appears irrelevant.
Nevertheless, as F. Oppenheim underlines, the acceptance of Hume's law is
an essential premise to formulate non-cognitive meta-ethical theories and,
indeed, the cognitive followers think that it is possible to demonstrate
the truth or falsehood of fundamental principles through considerations
that are located outside the given ethical system, while the non-cognitive
followers deny that such a demonstration can be given . It follows that
the non-cognitive formulation becomes relevant when conflicting moral
principles are being questioned (on the contrary however, for instance,
the doctrine of the ethical State implies a cognitive conception of ethics).
This analysis of Oppenheim must however be correctly understood; the non
demonstrability of the first principles must not be confused with the
ethical relativism or even with the nihilism: since deductive logic does
not exhaust the sphere of reasonableness, the non demonstrability of an
accepted principle does not implicate an emotional or irrational choice
(the motivations adopted by Aristotele for the principle of
non-contradiction in the IV book of Metaphysics or the reasons reported by
Apel or Habermas for the transcendental foundation of communicative
behaviour can without doubt be considered "reasonable" even if
not deductively demonstrated). Human rationality is also expounded from
the pure demonstration in formalized languages.
From this analysis, partly historical and partly theoretical, in my
opinion, the following conclusions can be made:
1) Emotivism and intuitionism are unsatisfactory ethical conceptions. 2)
Reason (intended in a logical-deductive sense) plays an effective role
both in ethical discussions and in choices. 3) There are some
characteristics of the ethical language (prescriptivity,
universalizability and predominance) that cannot be eluded (pain the non
significativity of the same language) by those who want to morally reason,
i.e. by those who intend to regulate their own behaviour on the basis of
acknowledged and coherent principles. 4) These characteristics can be
found whether or not all possible ontological-metaphysics foundations of
morals are taken into account. 5) The deontic logic systems allow the
formalization of ethical theories and - at least in principle - a rigorous
critical discussion of the same, but obviously nothing can be affirmed on
the value of truth of the axioms of a system. 6) The deontic logic systems
are neutral with regard to the validity of Hume's law, but they use the
Great division between descriptive (not modalised) sentences and
prescriptive sentences modalised by the obligation operator and no system
includes rules which allow the deduction of obligation sentences from
descriptive sentences. In the deontic logic systems Hume's law is assumed
as an implicit result of inferential (conventional) rules. 7) The
acceptance of Hume's law as a logical-linguistic thesis does not involve
the cancellation of values (nihilism) or ethical relativism or
indifferentism.
The footnotes can be read in pdf or word version of this
paper
|