mons. Giacinto Tredici
mons. Giuseppe Almici
dott. Giuseppe Camadini
prof. Giovanni Bazoli
Maurilio Lovatti
A
cynical bargain?
Giovanni Bazoli and the ownership of the Giornale di Brescia
In early 1980, the shares of Editoriale Bresciana (owner of the Giornale di Brescia) were sold by Banca S. Paolo in Brescia and Scuola Editrice to Gold Line, which in turn sold them to the Tovini Foundation. That year, Bazoli was secretary of the bank's board of directors (he had been a director since 1976 and would become vice president the following year) and vice president of the Scuola Editrice board (he had held this post since 1971). He was therefore one of the few, if not the only one, who understood the full implications of the clever operation orchestrated by Giuseppe Camadini with the support of Senator Lodovico Montini. He disagreed with the final solution (everything in the hands of the Tovini Foundation, a private law entity, with no control over the Bishop of Brescia) but he said nothing either at the board meetings or at the shareholders' meetings of the bank. Why? To answer the question, we need to go back 27 years.
April 1953. The Brescia DC (Democrazia Cristiana Party) provincial Committee, elected at the congress of October 21, 1951, was called upon to choose candidates for the Chamber of Deputies for the upcoming general elections of June 7, 1953. Two options confronted them: on the one hand, there were those who wanted to confirm the five outgoing deputies, who had performed well; on the other, there were those who advocated a partial renewal of the Brescia DC's parliamentary agency. The electoral commission chaired by Giuseppe Libretti, despite the presence of authoritative figures such as Mario Faini, Fabiano De Zan, and Giulio Onofri, was unable to reach an agreement and referred the matter to the provincial committee. After a lively discussion, Carlo Albini, deputy secretary of the CISL (Italian Confederation of workers Unions), proposed to the DC provincial committee a motion, inspired by Lodovico Montini (Giovanni Battista's brother), to be voted on by open ballot, which called for the confirmation of only three out of five outgoing deputies. The proposal was approved by a large majority. The majority was formed by a convergence of converging interests: replacing the two excluded candidates, the candidates most likely to be elected were Mario Pedini, provincial secretary of the DC, and Angelo Gitti, general secretary of the CISL. Pedini's election paved the way for Mayor of Brescia Bruno Boni's return to the Secretariat, while Gitti's, while formally retaining his post at the CISL, effectively elevated Albini to the union's leadership. Immediately thereafter, a secret ballot was held to select the three deputies to be confirmed: Lodovico Montini, Enrico Roselli, and Egidio Chiarini. Laura Bianchini and Stefano Bazoli were thus excluded from the list for the Chamber of Deputies. The dismissal of the former, a philosophy professor and staunch Dossetti supporter, was not surprising. The left-wing DC faction led by Giuseppe Dossetti had very little, if any, footing in Brescia, so Bianchini's exclusion, despite her undoubted ability and generous commitment as a parliamentarian, was logical and predictable. The exclusion of Stefano Bazoli, one of the most authoritative parliamentarians the province of Brescia has produced since the days of Giuseppe Zanardelli, is astonishing: cultured, profound, prestigious, a friend of Don Primo Mazzolari, and highly regarded by Alcide De Gasperi, who also entrusted him with the delicate and important role of liaising with Pietro Nenni during the difficult process of approving the electoral law. Furthermore, the reasons of poor representation invoked for Bianchini's nomination obviously do not apply to him. Perhaps Lodovico Montini considers him too open and independent in his judgments. He is also accused of not forcefully defending the principle of the indissolubility of marriage during the Constituent Assembly's debate on Article 24 of the Italian Constitution (which corresponds to the current Article 29). During the troubled affair of the parliamentary approval of the electoral law, Bazoli had expressed his opposition to such a high majority bonus (65% of seats for the majority coalition) as the one proposed by De Gasperi, which had also been criticized by Attilio Piccioni and other Christian Democrat leaders, and was then approved by Parliament. Perhaps this frankness and this autonomy of thought were not appreciated by Montini either (Worth noting on this matter is a harsh commentary, a quarter of a century later, by the newspaper La Repubblica: "Stefano, anch' egli avvocato, deputato alla Costituente per la DC, mandato a casa senza tanti complimenti dal partito quando, fatta la patria, si voleva incominciare a fare affari" - Stefano, also a lawyer, a member of the Constituent Assembly for the DC, sent home without much ceremony by the party when, having made the homeland, they wanted to start doing business - October 27, 1989, p. 3).
Bazoli is deeply embittered; he knows that Montini and Albini acted with the approval of mons. Giuseppe Almici, the episcopal delegate for Catholic Action, to whom Bishop Giacinto Tredici had entrusted the management of political and union affairs. However, during the election campaign, he didn't protest the unjust exclusion, and he said nothing so as not to damage the Christian Democrats.
After the elections, Stefano Bazoli wrote a letter to the Bishop, which clearly shows his bitterness, in which he stated that the Curia "exposed itself, without any imperious or even prudent reason […] in party political disputes." (on. avv. Stefano Bazoli's letter to Msgr. Giacinto Tredici, Bishop of Brescia, June 16, 1953, in Archivio storico diocesano di Brescia, Fondo Tredici, b. 98.) Implicitly, Bazoli complained about the excessive interference of Msgr. Almici in the political decisions of the DC, interference which was almost a habitual trait of the centralising and authoritative character of the priest, but which according to Bazoli somehow inappropriately exposed the Curia in the battles between the Christian Democratic factions, indirectly compromising the impartiality and role of the Bishop.
27
years later…
In 1980, a decisive turning point occurred in the reorganization of the ownership structure of Società Editoriale Bresciana (SEB), which owned the Giornale di Brescia newspaper. The report on Banca S. Paolo's 1979 financial statements, presented to the meeting on June 24, 1980, specified that, pursuant to instructions from the Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings, the bank's holdings in the newspapers must be sold. Therefore, it was announced that "the shares owned by Banca S. Paolo pertaining to Editoriale Bresciana were transferred in recent months to a group of publishing houses led by La Scuola of Brescia, which also includes Morcelliana publishing house, also of Brescia, and Studium of Rome." (i.e., Gold Line spa). This is to ensure "the commitment to moral and operational continuity that has characterized the daily operation throughout its years of operation, from the Liberation to the present." It should be noted that Banca S. Paolo had a large and widespread shareholder base, reflecting the local Catholic community: at the aforementioned meeting of June 24, 1980, 1232 shareholders were present in person or by proxy. No shareholder of the Bank raised concerns, because they all believed they were leaving their shares in good hands: that is, with Catholic publishing houses.
The Bank's 1980 financial statements show that the shares were sold for £ 874,912,000 (equivalent to £ 322,852,880, the book value, plus a £ 552,059,120 capital gain, recorded in profit from securities trading), a figure significantly below market value. In fact, as of December 31, 1978, SEB owned property valued at £ 1,459,510,000 (equivalent to a market value of at least double that; the building housing the newspaper was listed on the balance sheet in 1975 with a construction value of £474,502,854, while its value was approximately three times that); it owned plant and equipment valued at £ 852,842,000, again according to the book value, and cash deposits of £ 357,000,000. It also operated and owned the Giornale di Brescia newspaper. Even without precise estimates, it can be said that SEB was worth at least 6-8 billion.
In 1980, the Chairman of Banca S. Paolo was Adolfo Lombardi, Vittorio Montini was Vice Chairman, and Giovanni Bazoli was Secretary. The other directors were Pierluigi Buizza, Giuseppe Camadini, Davide Cancarini, Attilio Franchi, Osvaldo Passerini Glazel, Paolo Peroni, and Enrico Silvioli. Dr. Giuseppe Camadini had been Chairman of the Bank from 1970 to 1976.
The following year, 1981, all SEB and Gold Line shares were resold at the same price (no capital gains were declared) by the Scuola Editrice to the Tovini Foundation, managed by Dr. Giuseppe Camadini. To this day, Tovini Foundation owns 91.6% of Gold Line, which owns 74.3% of SEB, which controls the Giornale di Brescia. In effect, the diocese was completely excluded. Until 1980, SEB, and therefore the Giornale di Brescia, belonged to Banca S. Paolo (whose 1232 shareholders represented all aspects of Brescia's Catholic community, including various local religious orders, both male and female), with 8% held by the Bishop, meaning they were the common property of Brescia's Catholics. They are now, in effect, owned by a private, self-referential, and closed civil Foundation, accountable only to itself and not to the Bishop. It should be remembered that the shareholders of Banca S. Paolo approved in good faith the transfer of their shares to Gold Line of Rome, because at the time it represented the Catholic publishing houses of Brescia. They certainly could not have known that a few months later, Scuola Editrice would sell all its shares (again at a price far below market value) to the Tovini Foundation.
Indeed, in 1980, Gold Line borrowed money from a Roman bank to purchase SEB shares from Banca S. Paolo, since Gold Line still belonged to Scuola Editrice at the time. Immediately thereafter, in 1981, however, Scuola Editrice sold them back to Tovini Foundation, without disclosing anything to the meeting, except for a half-line stating "shares sold for £ 594,610,000." The Scuola Editrice was already controlled by the Opera per l'Educazione Cristiana, managed by Giuseppe Camadini, and everything was happening quietly. No member complained, because no one outside the Board of Directors knew or understood what was happening.
Tovini Foundation repaid the loan to the bank within a few years with SEB's profits and found himself owning it practically for free! In just over two years, Curia, Scuola Editrice, and Banca S. Paolo lost all influence over the Giornale di Brescia. It's worth noting that at the time, Camadini was on the boards of directors of Banca S. Paolo and Scuola Editrice, and was also a member of Gold Line, Tovini Foundation, and the Opera per l'Educazione Cristiana.
In fact, therefore, from 1980 to today, the Giornale di Brescia has in no way been dependent on the Diocese or an expression of the entire Catholic world of Brescia, but only of a part of it, that which was headed by Dr. Camadini, who in the 1960s and 1970s politically constituted the Dorothean (conservative) wing of the DC, which in the 1980s was linked to the right-wing DC and which, after the dissolution of the Catholic Party, represents the conservative and traditionalist wing of the Catholic world of Brescia.
If this is a brief summary of what happened, the question now arises: why did Professor Giovanni Bazoli, the only person who could truly understand what was happening, express no opposition or reservations, either publicly or within the corporate bodies? As we have seen, in 1980 he was secretary of the Bank's board of directors (he had been a director since 1976 and would become vice president the following year) and also vice president of the board of directors of the Scuola Editrice (he had been since 1971). He was therefore one of the few, if not the only one, able to understand the full implications of the skillful operation orchestrated by Giuseppe Camadini with the support of Senator Lodovico Montini.
Furthermore, he could not have ignored that Senator Montini was the leader of the moderate-conservative group that had so subtly orchestrated, under the skillful direction of Msgr. Giuseppe Almici, his father's removal from Parliament in 1953. Nor could he have ignored that Giuseppe Camadini, a protégé of Msgr. Almici and a man of the AC (Catholic Action), was a faithful executor of the now eighty-four-year-old Christian Democrat senator (much less open-minded and more conservative than his brother, the unforgettable Pope Paul VI, who had died two years earlier). He was also aware of the Montini-Camadini group's distrust of democratic Catholicism, and of their apprehension over the imminent succession to the bishop of Brescia, Msgr. Luigi Morstabilini, now approaching 75 years of age (he was born in 1907). Finally, he was well aware that within the Brescia DC, the Dorothean faction led by Mario Pedini, of which Montini and Camadini had been members in the 1960s, had harshly opposed the political actions of his brother Luigi Bazoli, at least since the 15th provincial congress of the DC in November 1965, when an internal majority had formed composed of the Fanfanians of Bruno Boni, Annibale Fada, and Fabiano De Zan and the left-wing DC, excluding the Morodoroteans (the Doroteans with Aldo Moro followers). The lawyer Luigi Bazoli, who tragically passed away on 10 October 1996, had been elected to the municipal Council of Brescia on 22 November 1964, and the following month he had become councillor of the first centre-left government in Brescia, a position he would hold until the administrative elections of June 1980. Paolo Corsini wrote: «Luigi Bazoli, responsible for urban planning in years of extraordinary growth, was an enlightened protagonist in the planning of the development of Brescia, so that his name and that of Leonardo Benevolo will remain inextricably linked to the choices that have profoundly influenced the city of the second half of the twentieth century».(P. Corsini, Biografie della città. Civitas, ricordo, memoria, Grafo, Brescia 2003, p. 48)
Bearing all this in mind, the silence of Professor Giovanni Bazoli appears at first sight incomprehensible. Why allow the Giornale di Brescia, which since the immediate post-war years belonged to the Banca S. Paolo and the diocesan Curia, that is, to the Catholic world in its entirety, to be handed over to that Montinian-Camadinian power group, a conservative and traditionalist power group, the same one that had unjustly excluded his father from the Chamber of Deputies and openly opposed the enlightened and courageous urban planning policy of his brother Luigi? Why remain silent? Out of opportunism, out of economic interests, out of professional and family ties (Stefano Bazoli had been a partner for years in the Bazoli-Montini law firm, which included his brother Ercoliano Bazoli and Lodovico Montini. Stefano's wife, Beatrice Folonari, was also related to Lodovico's wife.) out of a lack of courage?
There is perhaps a plausible hypothesis that can explain this behavior, a hypothesis I will attempt to explain and justify. But first, I must point out that a hypothesis is and remains a hypothesis; to become a historically reliable thesis, it must be based on incontrovertible documents, which in cases of this kind are rarely available. In the economic field, important agreements are rarely recorded! Three or four converging clues never make proof! In fact, not even ten clues... However, I believe that a plausible hypothesis, compatible with all the available data and documents, should be taken seriously, at least until someone is able to propose a plausible explanation for behavior that would otherwise seem incomprehensible and inexplicable.
The hypothesis I intend to advance is this: Giovanni Bazoli's rise to the presidency of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano (NBA) is closely linked to events in Brescia, to a sort of division of roles between Camadini and Bazoli, the former destined to become the supreme and unchallenged controller of the Catholic economic and cultural power bloc (Banca S. Paolo, Fondazione Tovini, Opera per l'Educazione Cristiana, La Scuola Editrice, Giornale di Brescia), the latter destined to represent the Bank at the national level. At first glance, this appears to be a glaring anachronism: Bazoli's appointment as President of the NBA dates back to August 1982, while the change in SEB's corporate structure was completed, as we've seen, in 1980. To understand the connections, we need to take a step back.
Banco Ambrosiano
The Milan branch of Banca S. Paolo di Brescia, while formally just one of many branches, actually played an important role because it handled all the bank's stock market transactions and maintained relationships with other banks. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the branch employed approximately 40 people.
From a report by the Milan Financial Police dated 12 June 1980, we know that in 1973 the Milan branch of Banca S. Paolo had sold 25550 shares of Toro Assicurazioni, owned by Centrale Finanziaria Generale (commonly known as Centrale; the Centrale, founded in 1925 with the aim of financing electricity and telephone companies, changed its nature after the nationalization of electricity in 1962. From 1971 it was controlled by Ambrosiano Bank through the Luxembourg-based Compendium), a wholly owned subsidiary of Roberto Calvi's Banco Ambrosiano, to Banque Lambert in Luxembourg. The Luxembourg bank, financed for this purpose by Centrale Finance of Nassau (Bahamas), also controlled by Centrale, in turn resold the shares to Konzentra of Vaduz (Liechtenstein), all within the scope of an operation aimed at transferring approximately 600 thousand shares of Toro, to constitute a black reserve which will be used by Roberto Calvi to acquire full control of Ambrosiano, between 1974 and 1975, through Suprafin SpA. Toro shares were bought back by Centrale in 1975, at 35000 lire per share, compared to a market price of 13775, for a total capital gain of over 23 billion. This gave rise to Calvi's illicit access to capital, which he used to acquire Ambrosiano, and also led to Calvi's accusation of illegal currency exportation. Milan-based Suprafin S.p.A. was controlled by two foreign financial companies, Inparfin S.A. and Teclefin A.G., which acted on the instructions of the Cisalpine Overseas Bank of Nassau, controlled by Ambrosiano Bank. Calvi had begun acquiring shares in the Milanese bank in 1973, through Radowall Financial Holding of Vaduz; in 1974, he became its CEO. Also in 1980, Nilo Gacci, an official at the Milan branch of Banca S. Paolo, was questioned at length by investigators, who sought to understand the mechanism by which Calvi had acquired these foreign funds, which had enabled him to take over Ambrosiano. In the years in which Calvi acquired control of Ambrosiano, Camadini was president of Banca S. Paolo (he resigned from the position due to incompatibility with the profession of notary) and was presumably not unaware of the meaning of Calvi's operations to acquire control of the Milanese Catholic bank. At the time, Calvi enjoyed the full trust of the Catholic world, to the point that in 1972 the IOR of Msgr. Marcinkus sold the controlling share package of Banca Cattolica del Veneto (approximately 37% of the shares) to the Ambrosiano Financial Centre, despite the very firm and explicit opposition of Msgr. Albino Luciani, the future Pope John Paul I.
Initially, Calvi acted in concert with Marcinkus's IOR, but when in 1978 the Bank of Italy began to investigate irregularities in the management of Ambrosiano, the relationship between Calvi and the Vatican, already scalded by the Sindona case,[10] began to deteriorate. (On April 17, 1978, 50 inspectors and officials from the Bank of Italy and the Foreign Exchange Office set up shop on Via Clerici, in the Milanese bank's offices. They remained there for seven months. On November 17, Chief Inspector Giulio Padalino signed a 500-page report, which contained an overall "not entirely favorable" assessment of Calvi's management. On December 14, 1978, Padalino himself filed a complaint with the Milan Public Prosecutor's Office, which would lead to Calvi's trial. The banker was sentenced in the first instance, on July 20, 1981, to four years in prison and a €15 billion fine). On September 27, 1974, the Milanese judiciary ruled in compulsory liquidation of Sindona's Banca Privata Italiana. Milanese lawyer Giorgio Ambrosoli was appointed liquidator. On October 3, Franklin National Bank, the American parent company of Sindona's financial activities, was declared insolvent: the most serious banking collapse in US history. Finally, on October 4, the Milan Public Prosecutor's Office issued two arrest warrants against Sindona for "false accounting records, false communications, and illegal distribution of profits." It is no coincidence that, in that very year (1978), Camadini proposed and obtained that Banca S. Paolo sell approximately 10,500 shares of Ambrosiano, as the final act of a series of operations that brought the Brescia bank's share in Ambrosiano to its historical minimum, that is, approximately 0.30%, from the initial 2%, which was the maximum share foreseen by the Statute of the Milanese institute. (Around 23000 Ambrosiano shares had already been sold by the Brescia bank in 1976). It may be significant to bear in mind that in the same year 1978, the "laico" ("secular", not belonging to Catholic financial groups) industrialist Luigi Lucchini from Brescia, a strongman of the CAB (Banca Credito Agrario Bresciano), still owned his entire 2% share of Ambrosiano. Evidently Camadini was better informed, thanks to his contacts with Vatican circles. The intermediary between Camadini and Vatican circles was Monsignor Giovanni Battista Re, also from Camuno and a close friend of the banker from Brescia, who in the years that interest us here (1977-82) was at the Secretariat of State (Monsignor Giovanni Battista Re, born in Borno in 1934, was ordained a priest by Monsignor Giacinto Tredici in 1957, and on September 12, 1979, was formally appointed Assessor for General Affairs of the Secretariat of State of the Holy See. However, he had already been aware of the affairs of the IOR in previous years, having served as personal secretary to the then Substitute of the Secretariat of State of the Holy See, Monsignor Giovanni Benelli, since 1971).
In early 1980, when the decisions relevant to the Giornale di Brescia affair were made, the rift between Calvi and the Vatican had not yet been definitively resolved. It is reasonable to assume that in the early months of 1980, the IOR was considering appointing other Catholic managers to Calvi, and there was still no full understanding of the hole that had been created at Ambrosiano. In such complex and still partly obscure affairs, it is very difficult to establish precise dates. However, from analyzing the documents, I am convinced that the turning point that led to the Vatican's irreparable distrust of Calvi was July 3, 1981, when Pellegrino De Strobel, the IOR's chief accountant, while examining the accounts of Banco del Gottardo (a bank owned by Ambrosiano) in Lugano, discovered a previously unknown hole of over a billion dollars. This is about half of the overall deficit created by Calvi's management. In the same months Roberto Calvi was in prison (He was arrested on May 20, 1981; he will be released on July 22, after the first degree conviction) and 5 days later, on 8 July, he attempted suicide. Already in this period, the Vatican was thinking of a solution to replace Calvi, promoting a consortium in which Banca S. Paolo would also have played a significant role (The only public source I have found that mentions this intention is M. Mucchetti, Curia e S. Paolo dettero l'alto là alla banca di Calvi e ora governano, in Bresciaoggi, 8 August 1982, p. 11). Nothing more was done when, on 18 November of the same year, Carlo De Benedetti bought 2% of Ambrosiano, with an investment of around 50 billion, leaving hopes of his direct intervention in the rescue of the Milanese bank, also because he had been given the green light by governor Ciampi (P. Gallo, Intesa S. Paolo. C'era una volta un fantasma inesistente, Baldini, Castoldi e Dalai, Milan 2007, p. 46).
Things took a turn for the worse the following year: on June 7, 1982, Calvi was voted out of office on the Ambrosiano Board of directors, on June 9 he fled Italy, and on June 18 he died hanging from scaffolding under Blackfriars Bridge in London, around two in the morning.
During the month of July, Beniamino Andreatta, Treasury Minister in the Forlani government, personally committed to forming a consortium to rescue Ambrosiano, excluding the provision of public funds to recapitalise the Milanese bank in order to avoid its liquidation. The consortium was made up of 7 banks, three public (IMI, BNL and S. Paolo di Torino) and 4 private (Banca Popolare di Milano, S. Paolo di Brescia, Credito Romagnolo and Banca Agricola Commerciale di Reggio Emilia; on December 5, 1982, Banca di Reggio Emilia will change its name to Credito Emiliano). On 6 August 1982, the Inter-ministerial Committee for Credit and Savings, chaired by Andreatta, with the presence of the governor of the Bank of Italy Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, placed Ambrosiano into compulsory liquidation, and at the same time the Board of Directors of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano was appointed, which took over as a guarantee for the commitments (excluding those of the foreign subsidiaries) of the Milanese institute. 50% of the capital of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano (NBA) is owned by private banks, but not in equal parts: Popolare di Milano has 20%, while the other three, including Banca S. Paolo of Brescia, only 10% each. At the time of incorporation of the Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano, on August 6, 1982, the share capital was L. 1,800,000,000 (C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Storia del Banco Ambrosiano. Fondazione, ascensore, asilo e declino, Laterza, Rome-Bari 2001, App. 9, p. 915). Banca S. Paolo therefore paid 180 million, but invested a total of 60 billion in the Milanese bank through rapidly implemented capital increases (Giornale di Brescia, August 7, 1982, pp. 1-2; Bresciaoggi, August 7, 1982, p. 11; La Repubblica, August 7, 1982, p. 27). To give an idea of the size of this figure, it is enough to remember that in 1980, the Brescia bank had recorded a net profit of approximately 10 billion. According to Pierdomenico Gallo, the first director of the NBA, Banca S. Paolo of Brescia is "the most fragile" of the seven founding banks (it was then the 36th most important Italian bank; P. Gallo, Intesa S. Paolo. C'era una volta un fantasma inesistente, p. 177).
According to Bazoli himself (Bazoli, il capitano bianco, La Repubblica, October, 2 1982) the other authoritative candidate for the presidency of the NBA was Piero Schlesinger, president of the Banca Popolare di Milano. Why was Bazoli chosen and not Schlesinger?
a) Banca Popolare di Milano had invested in Ambrosiano twice as much as S. Paolo of Brescia and furthermore, according to the agreements establishing the consortium, Banca Popolare di Milano was entitled to three directors on the board of directors, while the other private banks only had two (C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana. Dal Banco Ambrosiano a Intesa Sanpaolo, Il Mulino, Bologna 2013, p. 41; the agreements also provided that the president would be chosen by private banks, while the general director would be chosen by public banks);
b) Schlesinger was the president and undisputed leader of his bank, while Bazoli was only the number 4 of the Brescia bank (besides Camadini, both the president Adolfo Lombardi and the first vice president Vittorio Montini preceded Bazoli: the latter, in fact, had held the position since 1979, while Bazoli had been in office since 1981, therefore after the events relating to the ownership of the Giornale di Brescia);
c) Schlesinger was a full professor of private law at the Catholic University in Milan, and therefore had a more prestigious academic position than Bazoli;
d) Minister Andreatta had initially made no secret of his support for Schlesinger, even though he personally knew and respected both candidates;
e) Bazoli was so unknown in the Roman circles of the Bank of Italy and the Treasury Ministry that in one of the first preliminary meetings for the creation of the consortium of banks, he was forced to stand up and say "I am Bazoli",(P. Gallo, Intesa S. Paolo…, p. 178) because nobody knew him. Also attending the Roman meetings for Banca S. Paolo were Bazoli, along with Florio Gradi, director of the bank, and Gherardo Masetti Zannini, then secretary of the board of directors. Much of the preliminary studies and documentation was prepared by Giovanni Coppolino Perfumi, head of the bank's research and external relations office since 1968.Carlo Azeglio Ciampi himself did not remember who he was, so much so that in his diary, when noting the names of the participants for the various banks, he wrote: "S. Paolo di Brescia (Gradi and ...)" (Diari di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi 1982-1999, in C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana…, p. 433), not remembering either the surname of Bazoli or that of Masetti Zannini.
f) On the contrary, between the disappearance of Calvi and the establishment of the NBA, Ciampi had had various contacts (personal and telephone) with Schlesinger and Gradi, but not with Bazoli (Idem, pp. 432-435; Gradi had been received by Ciampi on July 5, 1982, at 10:00 am. Bazoli was received for the first time by Ciampi on August 20, at 10:30 am, p. 435).
In short, logic, common sense and respect for hierarchies would have naturally led to Schlesinger's presidency. Instead, Bazoli was chosen. Why? No one has ever provided a plausible explanation. Starting with Bazoli himself who, in an interview with Repubblica, incredibly declared: "I worked hard to create the NBA, but I was far from thinking that the maximum responsibility would fall on my shoulders […] There was a race to refuse this presidency between me and Schlesinger. I lost. However, it's not that I lack courage..." (Gianpaolo Pansa's interview wiyh Bazoli, in La Repubblica, 2 ottobre 1982, cit. in G. Galli, Nella giungla degli gnomi, Garzanti, Milan 2008, p. 121). Bazoli also stated, in an interview with Gianni Bonfadini: "But the real story is yet to be written. What has been written is just the tip of the iceberg." And to the question: "Will we ever have a complete story, a true and complete story?" he replied: "I absolutely think so. It's a commitment I made to the then President of the Republic Ciampi, according to whom the rescue of the Bank cost the State a relatively modest sum, certainly less than other bailouts of other foreign banks, for example, thanks also to the good work of the liquidators who recovered significant sums. We will write the story. I'm undecided," the professor confesses, "who to entrust the task to." An economist might be the right person... "I wouldn't want a book for specialists. I'd like a historian with writing skills, or a journalist. I'd like it to be a book to be read in schools, not one that sits on academic shelves." (Giornale di Brescia, August 8, 2007). The book he's referring to is perhaps the one that will be published a few months later: P. Gallo, Intesa S. Paolo. C'era una volta un fantasma nonesistente, but which provides no explanation for Bazoli's appointment as president. Pierdomenico Gallo, director of the NBA, had been central director of the Cassa di Risparmio di Torino and then CEO of Subalpina, controlled by the same Cassa. According to the logic of the agreements, a president representing the private banks is joined by a director designated by the public banks, namely Gallo, proposed by the Istituto S. Paolo of Turin. It's unlikely, but not impossible, that in 2007 Bazoli had already planned to entrust Bellavite Pellegrini with another book, the one published in May 2013. And also in the NBA minutes no. 1, it appears that Bazoli declared that the election as president was "deeply painful" for him and was accepted by feeling the "civic duty" to offer his collaboration within the limits of his strength in such a delicate initiative. (Minutes n. 1, August, 6 1982, in C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Storia del Banco Ambrosiano, p. 378-379) Giancarlo Galli comments: "The personality of Giovanni Bazoli remains to be deciphered. On the one hand, absolute personal honesty, on the other, unspeakable ambitions behind the smokescreen of humility and disinterest in positions of power." (G. Galli, Nella giungla degli gnomi, p. 121).
The explanation proposed by Bazoli seems unlikely. Given the economic, prestige and power implications that the position has brought about in the years that followed we simply cannot imagine a race to refuse: "you take the presidency..."; "no, not me..."; "neither do I"; "okay, if you really insist...". To give an idea of the bankers' earnings, it's enough to recall that in a single day, Bazoli earned 20 million euros from the Intesa-S. Paolo merger (G. Galli, Nella giungla degli gnomi, p. 329). To be fair, it should be noted that the annual salary for the BNA presidency was initially, in 1982, only 200 million lire, lower than the salary of a bank president at the time. Also to be fair, it should be noted that Bazoli, very discreetly, donated a quarter of his merger fee to charity, allocating it to healthcare facilities in Mali.
Camadini also prefers not to answer on this point. Interviewed by Giancarlo Galli on 10 February 2010, at the headquarters of the Paolo VI Foundation in Concesio (BS), Giuseppe Camadini recounts a meeting in the summer of 1982 (we deduce in July, because it was after Calvi's death) at his home, in the presence of Lodovico Montini and Giorgio Zanotto, then vice-president of the Verona-based Cattolica Assicurazioni. The interviewer comments: "Catholics were therefore called to react, forming a team..." and Camadini replies: "a primary commitment was urgently needed, a unitary tension among Catholics. Looking up and forward..." But to Galli's more specific question: "Was there also talk of the candidacies of Giovanni Bazoli and the Milanese Piero Schlesinger for the rebirth of the Banco Ambrosiano, interpreting the wishes of the powerful Treasury Minister Nino Andreatta?" Camadini does not answer because, the journalist underlines, "he prefers to fly high". (G. Galli, Il banchiere innamorato. La straordinaria vita di Giorgio Zanotto tra la sua famiglia, la sua Verona e la sua banca, Marsilio, Venezia 2011, p. 200-201).
Indeed, even the newspapers of the time provide no enlightening explanations for this surprising appointment, aside from the learned observation that both Banca S. Paolo of Brescia and Ambrosiano had been founded by Giuseppe Tovini (the former in 1888, the latter in 1896), suggesting that Bazoli's appointment undoubtedly had symbolic significance. Il Sole-24ore, one of the few newspapers to venture any comment on this appointment, however, seems to miss the mark. In fact he writes: "Compared to the indiscretions of the last few days, the candidacies of Florio Gradi and Francesco Cesarini for the presidency and that of Enrico Filippi for the vice-presidency have therefore fallen." (Giovanni Bazoli da oggi presidente del Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano SpA, in Il Sole-24ore, August, 7 1982, p. 6). Obviously we do not know where the diligent journalist collected such fanciful indiscretions: Florio Gradi was simply the director of the Banca S. Paolo, an official at the time chosen by Camadini and Lombardi because he came from the Bank of Italy (Florio Gradi had been director of the New York branch of the Bank of Italy); Francesco Cesarini was a councillor of the Banca Popolare di Milano, of which Schlesinger was president. The candidacy of Enrico Filippi, however, had not fallen at all! A few days later he was nominated vice-president, together with Ruggero Ravenna, who represented not only the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, but also the other two public banks.
The newspaper Il Giornale also reports on the conflicts inherent in the nomination of the president of the NBA: on the very day of the nomination, it mentions among the possible candidates first of all Schlesinger and then Gaetano Lazzati, president of the dissolved supervisory board, Roberto Ruozi, professor at Bocconi University and Francesco Cesarini, professor of banking techniques at the Catholic University of Milan, and therefore a colleague of both Schlesinger and Bazoli and, as we have seen, advisor of the Banca popolare di Milano.(Il Giornale, August 6, 1982). According to Bellavite Pellegrini, Francesco Paolo Beato reportedly told him that Bazoli had considered replacing him as president with Cesarini. (C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Storia del Banco Ambrosiano, p. 42, note n. 48).
Much more precise and documented is Massimo Mucchetti, who from the columns of Bresciaoggi, (M. Mucchetti, Curia e S. Paolo…, p. 11) reports that Bazoli was part of a trio of candidates, which in addition to Schlesinger also included Francesco Cesarini. Mucchetti clearly identifies Bazoli's strong points ("…the SETA operation in S. Zeno and Roncadelle through the Intesa of which Bazoli is president. Then the vice-presidency of the Bank. Then the entry of the Intesa into the oldest Italian financial company listed on the stock exchange, the Florentine Mittel, which definitively strengthens the bond between Bazoli and the new generation of Brescian Catholic financiers Gherardo Masetti Zannini, Giuseppe Tampalini, the Palazzani brothers.
Mucchetti then underlines the fundamental decision-making role of Andreatta (a role which is also confirmed by other witnesses) who was politically close to the Brescians Mino Martinazzoli and Franco Salvi. This thesis was also confirmed by Senator Prof. Fabiano De Zan (interview with the author, May 13, 2013). But even with all these elements which help to understand, not even Mucchetti is able to explain what remains inexplicable. Why not Schlesinger? Why, supposing that from the Vatican there was pressure on Andreatta for a president coming from S. Paolo of Brescia (perhaps considered more reliable) why not Camadini, not the president Adolfo Lombardi, why not the vice-president Vittorio Montini?
Regarding Camadini, Giancarlo Galli observes: "In that summer of 1982 […] it would have been an easy game for the notary Giuseppe Camadini, never mentioned by the media that blast at point-blank range against the IOR, but highly appreciated in the Roman Curia, to obtain the presidency of the Banco Ambrosiano. To resuscitate it, as miraculously happened to Lazzaro. He has the qualifications, the legitimacy, and instead he doesn't even try. Instead, promoting, at the table of the Treasury Minister Andreatta, the candidacy of Bazoli. A circumstance that, years later, Andreatta did not want to confirm or deny." (G. Galli, Nella giungla degli gnomi, p. 117). It's worth noting that Bellavite Pellegrini, in his 562-page monumental Una storia italiana. Dal Banco Ambrosiano a Intesa Sanpaolo doesn't mention Camadini, the undoubted protagonist of the affair, even once! And this despite the "valuable testimony" of Giovanni Bazoli, gathered "over the course of numerous meetings" (p. 8). Evidently, despite hundreds of pages, inconvenient or unwelcome truths must be ignored.
That Bazoli rose to office with the decisive support of Camadini and the Roman Curia seems certain. Even Ciriaco De Mita, "sipping tea with a frown in his brow, in the Principe e Savoia bar in Milan" is said to have stated: "The good Bazoli is an instrument, others are pulling the strings." And when asked more specifically he replied: "Andreatta and Camadini, under the protection of Paul VI." (G. Galli, Nella giungla degli gnomi, p. 106-107). Since Pope Paul VI died in 1978, with this phrase De Mita was referring to the Roman Curia.
That Schlesinger aspired to the position and did not appreciate the unexpected (for him) overtaking by Bazoli in the final rush seems beyond dispute to me. This is confirmed by the fact that a few years later, in 1989, he attempted to inflict a deadly blow on Bazoli himself. The facts are known, and I will limit myself to briefly recalling them, without adding anything new on this. On 22 September 1989, the Popolare di Milano (La Repubblica, September 23 1989, p. 40; C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana…, p. 172) announced its intention to sell its BNA share package to Generali for 340 billion, 51.5 million shares, equal to approximately 14% (which corresponds to approximately 10.5% of the shares of Ambroveneto, which would be born from the merger between NBA and Banca Cattolica del Veneto, initially planned for mid-October, then completed in December). Schlesinger, with the support of Cuccia and Mediobanca, expressed his intention to sell the package to Generali, perhaps "in disharmony with Nanni [Giovanni Bazoli] who day after day was silently marginalising him." (G. Galli, Nella giungla degli gnomi, p. 132). The evident aim was to reduce Bazoli's dominant role in Ambroveneto. Giancarlo Galli comments: "Ambroveneto, losing all autonomy, with the transfer of the "Schlesinger share" to Generali, combined with the stock market sweeps, would end up in the melting pot, reducing Bazoli to a minor president." (Ivi, p. 133). In order to facilitate Enrico Cuccia's plan and hit Bazoli, Schlesinger violates the BNA shareholders' agreement, which was formed on 3 March 1988 and of which Popolare di Milano was a member. (The union agreement comprised a total of 56.9% of the shares, distributed as follows: Popolare 13.3%, Gemina and Crediop 12.9% each, the Venetian banks 16.8%, and S. Paolo di Brescia 6.7%. Article 4 of the agreement stipulated that any potential seller had to sell his shares to a buyer chosen by the union itself within 30 days; C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana…, p. 170-171, note no. 9) As is equally well known, Bazoli brilliantly parries the blow, managing, through his friend Romain Zaleski,[40] to bring the French bank Credit Agricole into Ambroveneto, as his ally, thus strengthening his dominant position in the bank and thwarting Cuccia's complex plan, which envisaged the creation of "a galaxy of the North, led by Generali, Gemina and Comit." (The possible intervention of the French bank was made known by the newspapers in the second half of October. La Repubblica, October 22, 1989, p. 41; October 24, 1989, p. 43. The French bank will intervene with a significant commitment of 283 billion: La Repubblica, December 17, 1989, p. 46; on Cuccia's plan, see La Repubblica, December 30, 1989, p. 36). Romain Zaleski (born in Paris in 1933, but of Polish origins, an engineer) scaled the Tassara di Breno in 1984 and turned it into a springboard for brilliant financial and stock market operations. Surprisingly, Bellavite Pellegrini's book, which devotes a full 22 pages to the story, doesn't even mention Zaleski in passing in connection with Credit's entry into Ambroveneto. Evidently, being too obedient to the powerful can also cause amnesia, perhaps unconscious... It should be added thatBazoli does not register opposition to this move, neither from Ciampi (who fully supports him) nor from Forlani and Craxi. (Diari di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, p. 449-453). Furthermore, the new trade union agreement formed for Ambroveneto following the entry of Credit Agricole, provides for a minimum share of 10% for the participants. Since the share of Banca S. Paolo of Brescia was then equal to 5.3%, this makes it necessary to increase the capital of the Brescia bank, which initially appears to have met with reservations on the part of Camadini (La Repubblica, 24 novembre 1989, p. 44).
If this is the fundamental story, in which the Bazoli – Schlesinger clash takes on dramatic and decisive aspects for the future of the bank, there had been no shortage of disagreements between the two bankers in the past, starting from the autumn of 1982. For example, on September 1, 1982, Ciampi invited Schlesinger "to collaborate with Bazoli," particularly on the sale of Rizzoli (Diario di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, p. 436); on November 9, on Ambrosiano's participation in the Rizzoli shareholders' meeting, which Schlesinger was in favor of, but not Bazoli (C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana…, p. 74); on July 4, 1984, a proposal for the purchase of Banca Cattolica by Popolare di Milano, which Bazoli was opposed, was sent to Ciampi through Francesco Cingano (Diario di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, p. 442). On the events of 1989, Bazoli "bitterly criticizes Schlesinger's conduct" (Diario di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, 25 September 1989, p. 450).
Bazoli's role, importance, and influence have undoubtedly grown significantly over the years, compared to what could have been expected in the early 1980s (at the time of the rumored role-sharing agreement with Camadini), thanks in part to the dedication, expertise, commitment, and professionalism the Brescian banker displayed in his diverse activities. But it certainly cannot be forgotten that Bazoli's rise, and his very recognition by the political world and the so-called powerful, is closely tied to the sale of the Rizzoli-Corriere della Sera (RCS) shares, which were held by Centrale, controlled by Banco Ambrosiano.
As is known, at the time of the formation of the New Banco Ambrosiano, the Centrale held as collateral approximately 41% of the RCS shares owned by Angelo Rizzoli, directly or through Finriz (8%), while RCS owed the Ambrosiano group approximately 70 billion. (On September 10, 1982, Rizzoli was supposed to repay the NBA $20 billion in loans due, but only managed to pay $5 billion; C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana…, p. 63). According to Rizzoli, those 70 billion were largely offset by the approximately 150 billion that the previous management of Ambrosiano should have paid to RCS for the capital increase decided on 29 April 1981 and which instead had been diverted to the foreign accounts of Licio Gelli, Umberto Ortolani and Bruno Tassan Din. ($95 million, approximately 108 billion lire, paid by Ambrosiano on April 30, 1981, were transferred to the Recioto, Zirka, and Telada accounts at Rothschild Bank in Zurich and then hidden in tax havens, as recognized in rulings favorable to Rizzoli issued by the Court of Cassation, the Irish Supreme Court, and the Swiss courts. According to the report of Rizzoli's board of auditors dated December 31, 1981, the entire $150 billion capital increase was paid by Ambrosiano to Rizzoli). Obviously the NBA did not intend to take responsibility for the illicit diversion of funds which dated back to the management of Roberto Calvi and the members of the P2. Unable to repay its debts, all of its RCS shares, both the 41% pledged to Centrale and the remaining 10.2% owned by Rizzoli, were seized, and Rizzoli was reported and arrested (he was later fully acquitted years later). Centrale also owned another 41% of RCS shares, purchased in April 1981 (the remainder, less than 10%, was owned by Rothschild and, to a lesser extent, by small shareholders).
On 4 October 1984, the RCS shares were sold to a consortium initially formed by Gemina (of which Mediobanca held 34% and Fiat 16.7%), by the Cremonese steel industrialist Giovanni Arvedi and by the financial company Mittel, to which Meta of the Montedison group was subsequently added. The addition of Meta appears to have been Bazoli's attempt to appease Craxi, who opposed the sale of RCS to Gemina. Furthermore, Bazoli, through Intesa Finanziaria, owned a significant stake in Mittel; however, in September of the same year, he resigned as a director of Mittel to remove, at least formally, the incompatibility of being both a seller (as NBA and also as president of Centrale, a position he assumed a few months before the transaction, on June 26, 1984) and a buyer (as Mittel) of RCS shares. The price of the sale of the Rizzoli shares was such that they were sold for a total of approximately 9 billion lire (this figure obviously does not include Rizzoli's capital increase in the spring of 1985, nor any subsequent ones; more detailed information on the capital increases and the subsequent union agreement can be found in C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana…, p. 118). In several interviews, Angelo Rizzoli accused Giovanni Bazoli of this "sell-off" with very serious accusations and unjustified insults.
In January 1996, the Milan Court of Civil Appeals rightly convicted Angelo Rizzoli of defamation against Giovanni Bazoli, which occurred in 1984. This judgment concluded with Angelo Rizzoli being ordered to pay damages, as determined by the Brescia Court in a ruling dated October 28, 1998.
Rizzoli's statements must therefore be carefully assessed for their reliability. In fact, the transfer price of the shares was influenced downwards by the fact that the provisions of the Inter-ministerial Committee for Credit and Savings and of the Bank of Italy itself prohibited banks from owning newspaper shares and imposed their sale. However, even considering this aspect, the transfer price appears surprisingly low. As Angelo Rizzoli himself reports, "an accounting appraisal carried out on behalf of the Milan court by Professor Luigi Guatri, former rector of Bocconi University, valued the assets alone, without the values of the newspaper and goodwill, at at least 270 billion lire." (Interview by Stefano Lorenzetto with Angelo Rizzoli. in Il Giornale, February, 21 2010).
Even more reliable is the careful analysis by Massimo Mucchetti: "nonetheless, the loss of profit, or rather the missing profit, for the seller [the Centrale which belonged to Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano] is clear from the comparison between the sum (90 billion lire) that the industrial buyers paid in 1984 and 1986 as capital increases of RCS, therefore without any benefit for Nuovo Banco, and the valuation (893 billion) that only three years later, in 1987, RCS will make of itself on the occasion of the entry, with 10 percent, of the French publishing group Hachette." (M. Mucchetti, Il baco del Corriere, Feltrinelli, Milan 2006, p. 59). In essence, for Mucchetti, the figures in the balance sheets show that Cuccia's Mediobanca, Fiat and the other companies in the purchasing group made an incredible golden deal: between the purchase price and the capital increases they spent an amount roughly 6-7 times lower than the value of RCS, of which they acquired control at the expense of Centrale and therefore of NBA.
Domenico Gallo, director of Ambrosiano, confirms that the Fiat-Mediobanca consortium struck a golden deal, although he attributes the paltry sale price to regulatory constraints. Mucchetti reports: "More than twenty years later, one evening in June 2005, at the end of a dinner at the Società del Giardino in Milan, his club, the banker Pier Domenico Gallo still sighs: «Ah, if Ciampi had left the Corriere in our hands for a couple of years. We would have sold it, of course: but for a thousand billion and not for zero lire. But the law is the law». Gallo knows what he is talking about: he was the general director of the Ambrosiano after Roberto Calvi and therefore knew the accounts of RCS Editori well. His words confirm what emerges from the numerical comparisons. Giovanni Agnelli, in short, was telling the truth, when he said that he had joined the “Corriere” because they had asked him to, almost to render a service to the Country. But not the whole truth. By investing in RCS, Agnelli made a golden deal in that October of 1984."
Even Professor Gaetano Pecorella, who had direct knowledge of the documents, as Tassan Din's lawyer, confirmed the inadequacy of the price of sale of the RCS shares to the consortium: "the hole in the accounts […] allowed the consortium of the "saviours of the fatherland in inverted commas", as Cesare Romiti, who was part of it as Fiat, defined it, to take possession for just 9 billion lire of a company which was worth, according to estimates, between 270 and 440." (Interview by Stefano Lorenzetto, in Il Giornale, May, 15 2010).
Before the sale of RCS shares, three purchase proposals had reached Centrale: one from the Gemina consortium, presented by Guido Rossi, one from Victor Uckmar and one from the entrepreneur Giorgio Borletti. Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini reports a statement by Bazoli, according to which the evaluation of the offers should not be based only on the amount of the price, but also on the requirement represented by "the capacity of the intervention group to present a qualitative standing suitable for the Rizzoli – Corriere della Sera group, in addition to the financial characteristics necessary to support the restructuring." (C. Bellavite Pellegrini, Una Storia italiana…, p. 117, note n. 18). The same author also recalls an editorial by Eugenio Scalfari, who "drew the readers' attention to the fact that among the shareholders of Mittel there was also a company owned by the Curia of Brescia, drawing inspiration from this to support the thesis of a presumed clerical characterisation of the new shareholding." (Ivi, p. 118).
To explain the sale price, which was so disproportionately low compared to the value of the company being sold, the historian of the Ambrosiano writes: "... at the time of the receivership, the economic prospects of a company like Rizzoli were considered by the market to be uncertain, if not predominantly negative, as is also true that over the course of two years no buyer showed serious interest in the company, despite repeated public requests." (Ivi, p. 120; the various appraisals on the value of the sold company are not even mentioned). He also states that "the economic conditions of the alternative offer put forward at the last minute by the group headed by Uckmar were aligned with those of Gemina (as well as those of the very fragile third offer by Borletti)." (Ivi, p. 121; this statement is not supported by any figures, nor documented in any way, not even in a footnote. It should therefore be accepted on faith).
Even with these mitigating circumstances, Bellavite Pellegrini cannot deny the buyers' golden deal, even if he tries to downplay it. He writes: "The fact remains that the group involved in Rizzoli carried out an operation which initially proved to be an excellent deal, especially for the strong Gemina shareholders united in a syndicate agreement who, with a modest investment, found themselves in the position of exercising a controlling power over a listed company of national importance." (Ivi, p. 121).
It's therefore no surprise that Bazoli, who Cuccia previously considered "a nobody," a temporary president destined to soon return to obscurity, began an extraordinary rise after the sale of RCS, becoming one of the most influential men in Italy.
I
still have a doubt. Stefano Bazoli died on 1 September 1981.
Senator Fabiano De Zan always remembers him as very lucid, even
in the last year of his life. He writes: "One evening last January,
when I saw him sunk in the armchair of his ancestral home in Piazza
del Foro, he seemed to me a patriarch who had reached the pinnacle
of wisdom." (Stefano Bazoli. Ricordi e testimonianze,
CeDoc, Brescia
1982, p. 45). He therefore did not see his
son at the head of the Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano and then of Italian
Catholic finance. However, he had time to learn about the affair of the
ownership of the Giornale di Brescia, which concluded in
the first months of 1980. What reactions would he have had? In his
magnanimity and wisdom, would he have forgiven those who 27 years
earlier had so subtly, meanly and unjustly excluded him from Parliament?
Or would he have expressed some reservations about the sale of the
shares of the local newspaper to de facto private Foundation? Or,
considering how much good his son Giovanni could have done for the
country and the Catholic world (even if his precise role wasn't yet
clearly defined), did he suffer the cynical trade-off? Questions that
will perhaps remain forever unanswered. But as we know, historical
research never reveals the whole truth.
Maurilio Lovatti
Brescia, June, 2 2013
Postscript (agosto 2015)
In June
2013, Professor Giovanni Bazoli telephoned me several times to
argue that my interpretation of the facts was untrue. In summary,
Professor Bazoli stated:
1) there is no connection between the ownership of the Giornale di
Brescia and his subsequent rise to the presidency of Nuovo Banco
Ambrosiano;
2) Professor Piero Schlesinger was not aspiring to the presidency
of the NBA;
3) the choice of the NBA president was due exclusively to Minister Andreatta;
4) when the Board of Directors of Banca S. Paolo decided to
participate in the rescue of Ambrosiano, Dr. Giuseppe Camadini was
absent due to illness;
5) previously, Dr. Camadini had written a letter to Adolfo
Lombardi, in which he stated that it would not have been prudent for Banca
S. Paolo to invest more than €30 billion in the NBA (while the
rescue plan required a commitment of €60 billion, including the purchase
of shares and recapitalizations agreed upon within the rescue consortium);
Dr. Camadini subsequently complained that his letter was not read to the
Board of Directors when it was deciding on participating in the
rescue;
6) Engineer Romain Zaleski played no role in Credit Agricole's
entry into Ambroveneto in 1989.
Regarding points 1, 2, and 3, I can only acknowledge Professor Bazoli's reconstruction. I have no documented reason to doubt his assertions, but I think that, in light of his reconstruction, his silence regarding the transaction involving the ownership of the Giornale di Brescia is even more inexplicable.
Since all possible witnesses are now deceased, I have been trying for over two years to find evidence or clues that could confirm, or possibly refute, Professor Bazoli's reconstruction. Among other things, I asked Dr. Costantino Vitali, president of Banco di Brescia, to consult the minutes of the Board of Directors of Banca S. Paolo. I received the following response:
Letter from dott. Costantino Vitali dated September, 4 2014
Based on the reasons given for denying me access to the minutes, I have submitted the following new request:
Gent. mo dott. Costantino Vitali,
I
received your esteemed note of September 4, 2014, for which I thank you.
It has enabled me to understand precisely why I am unable to consult the
minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors of Banca S. Paolo.
I therefore submit a much more limited request, compatible with the
confidentiality requirements you outlined. I ask you to provide the dates
of all meetings in 1982, along with the names of the directors present and
absent. This will ensure there will be no "disclosure" of data
relating to "customer financial and credit transactions."
Of the former advisors, only Professor Giovanni Bazoli is alive and active,
and I believe he would have no problem allowing me to report his presence,
since he himself suggested one of the research avenues I am currently
pursuing. In any case, if you deem it necessary, you may request his
explicit prior authorization. Thanking you for your attention and for the
patience with which you have examined my requests, I extend my warmest
regards.
Brescia,
September, 24 2014
Maurilio Lovatti
Even this more limited and reasonable request was rejected. The text of the letter is nevertheless interesting for the reasons given:
Letter from dott. Costantino Vitali dated November, 6 2014
Finding this avenue of inquiry closed, I attempted to identify indirect clues. On June 9, 1982, a conference on the religious and civic commitment of Father Giulio Bevilacqua was held in Brescia. Chaired by Carlo Albini, Albini introduced the proceedings, before reading a letter from Dr. Giuseppe Camadini, stating that the latter "is prevented from participating for health reasons (and we send him our fervent best wishes for a speedy recovery)." [L'impegno politico e civile di padre Bevilacqua, CeDoc, Brescia 1983, p. 9; Camadini's letter is on p. 10 and 11]. A check in the Giornale di Brescia shows that Giuseppe Camadini did not participate in any public initiative or other event during the period from June to September 1982. Professor Bazoli's statement regarding Camadini's illness during the period in question would therefore appear to be supported by these clues. Camadini's letter to Eng. Lombardi, which Bazoli was able to see because the recipient himself allowed it, is certainly not included in the documents, even though it may have been kept in the papers of the then president of Banca S. Paolo of Brescia.
Professor Bazoli's thesis regarding Dr. Camadini's opposition to S. Paolo's intervention in the rescue of the Ambrosiano seems plausible, but at this time it cannot be confirmed on the basis of the documents.
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mons. Giacinto Tredici
mons. Giuseppe Almici
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dott. Giuseppe Camadini
prof. Giovanni Bazoli
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